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0. 
 
Here it will be necessary to establish, as and at the beginning, a 
set of manoeuvres; a moving backwards and forwards in the attempt to 
work towards the position that holds a thinking of the ethical and thus a 
thinking of the subject in place.1 If there is a way to begin and thus to 
establish a point of departure which will continue to return then it can 
be located in one of the opening formulations advanced in Schmidt’s 
text ‘Hermeneutics as Original Ethics’.2 It is a formulation that 
complicates the approach that is taken overall but which reveals, at the 
same time, the continuity of orientation. Ethics, for Schmidt, has 
become an issue. Marred by difficulties whose acuity demands another 
way of thinking leads to the position in which he claims that  ‘the very 
idea of ethics has become questionable.’3 For Schmidt this leads to the 
necessity of differentiating the ethical from the conceptual. Now, even 
though there are a number of ways to understand Schmidt’s formulation 
what it sets in play, at the beginning, is the presence of the ethical as 
an ‘idea’.  
 
One path that is opened up here involves the claim that it is the 
ethical as an idea that ‘has become questionable’ such that what then 
becomes necessary is different form of thought such that what then 
emerges as a task is a way of thinking the ethical such that it then 
breaks any relation to the ‘idea’ and thus to the conceptual. This is 
Schmidt’s position. There is however a different understanding that can 
be brought into play. Namely, it is not the ethical as conceptual that is 
problematic. Rather, the argument would then have to be that whatever 
current difficulties or impasses can be found within ethical thought they 
arise from the contemporary conceptualization of the ethical, and thus 
not from the conceptual tout court. Moreover, in light of this other 
possibility it will be argued that what is left out of most 
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conceptualizations, and equally in Schmidt’s attempt to disassociate the 
ethical and the conceptual, is any sustained engagement with what will 
continual to be identified as the predicament within which life is lived 
and thus within which life has to be thought. Hence, rather than break 
with the conceptual the project of the ethical demands a different 
thinking; another thinking within which on the level of the ideational or 
the conceptual there is the recovery of another possibility rather than a 
refusal of the concept.  
 
The suggestion is therefore that while Schmidt is right to argue 
that the ‘idea’ of the ethical has become problematic, it is does not 
then follow that it is then necessary to move from this recognition which 
is the identification of an impasse, to the either refusal of the 
conceptual or the privileging of either the aesthetic or the work of art as 
providing the basis of a new consideration of ethical life. To put the 
position emphatically, there is no reason to conclude from the presence 
of an impasse that beauty is the ‘glimmer of an otherwise inconceivable 
ethical sense’.4 Such moves, even if they were wanted, founder in the 
attempt to give them a coherent formulation. It is however this position 
that has to be argued. This will occur by taking seriously the presence of 
what has been called the predicament, and then secondly by paying 
attention to specific aspects of Schmidt’s interpretation of Kant. What 
gets displaced in that interpretation is both the role of the ‘concept’ 
within Kant’s arguments in the Critique of the Power of Judgment as 
well as the way the relation between the sensible and the supersensible 
is established. In regards to the former it needs to be remembered that 
even in the case of the symbol - and this is one of Schmidt’s most 
important examples - there is neither a sustained nor a definitive 
separation from the role of concepts since the symbol is what Kant 
describes as the ‘indirect presentation’ of the conceptual. Once the 
‘indirect’ is linked to the indeterminate, and then to a rethinking of 
contingency as that which occurs within the separation – a separation 
that becomes a relation of indetermination – between the sensible and 
the supersensible, what then emerges is the impossibility of any 
distancing of the conceptual. What matters however is how both the 
indirect and indeterminate relation are then to be thought. There is a 
necessity to take up this thinking. Thinking would have a different 
exigency. The conceptual while given and while already positioned 
would come to be rethought. Other possibilities for thought are 
recovered and sustained as a result. In sum, what his means is that there 
could be then no move to the aesthetic as though it took place 
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independently of the conceptual. Moreover it is the presence of relations 
of indetermination that allow the problem of subjectivism to be 
overcome and the realm of judgment to be maintained as effective. If 
an example were necessary note Kant in the First Introduction to the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment where he writes of the  
‘indeterminate principle of a purposive arrangement of nature’.5 It is, 
after all, the latter that allows for the reflective powers of judgment to 
be operative.   
 
 
1. 
 
To begin this call upon thought, this other thinking of life, one 
which is consistent with what prompts Schmidt’s overall project, 
involves beginning with where ‘we’ are. Life cannot be posed, let alone 
thought philosophically, without taking into consideration its taking 
place. (Life as being-in-place.) What would it be to think that there 
were just life? Let alone to think that life was already just. As though 
that which is proper to life did not have to be wrested from the giveness 
of facticity. Factical life is not to be identified with the every day. Were 
it to be then life would be logically identical with that which is lived. 
One would complete the other. Its potentiality and its actuality would 
be the same. The contention here is that there is another possibility for 
life, one that comes from an understanding of its predicament. What 
then is life’s predicament? More emphatically, what is the predicament 
of ethical life? Life’s predicament is the setting in which a concern with 
life finds itself. This claim is not simply one in which history is evoked. It 
is rather that the predicament is the moment in which the being of 
being human continues to attain actuality (or attempts the same). To 
which it should be added that the non-identity of attempting and 
attaining is of fundamental importance. It creates an ineliminable 
spacing at the centre of human activity. And this occasions a sense of 
attainment in which what is central are the processes of actualization 
and thus the processes in which what continues to appear is human 
being. In other words, to engage life philosophically, once what is 
distanced is the identification of life with that which occurs, which 
would be empiricism’s crude gesture, is to think the problem of 
actualization. What this means is that life in its separation from its 
reduction either to the purely empirical – which would be life within 
naturalism – or to the immutability of fated being, has to be thought in 
terms of life’s own potentialities. Those potentialities have to be 
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described. This is of course a project that has to be taken up. The 
argument would be that such a description involves staking a 
commitment to a determination of the being of being human in terms of 
commonality and place. Being-in-place and being-in-common would 
delimit the contours of a philosophical anthropology.6  The consequence 
of which is that exclusion and restriction from place and commonality 
have to be understood as restrictions on the actualization of a 
potentiality. The interplay of potentiality, actualization and restriction 
delimits the predicament. There is a constitutive spacing holding all of 
these elements in play.  
 
Even if a start were made with an event that was in each instance 
original and thus allowing every beginning to be unique it still remains 
the case that this uniqueness is restricted (and restrictive) insofar as it 
only pertains to the irreplaceability of that event with another. Birth 
occurs once; equally death. And yet, despite the irreplaceability of that 
event, that uniqueness has a twofold articulation within the 
predicament within which it is occurring and where it continues. The 
continuity of becoming is itself a necessary condition; the actualization 
within that continuity of potentialities is always contingent. 
Potentialities need not be actualised. Hence the predicament is not just 
the condition of any claim to uniqueness.  That predicament leaves its 
trace on the production of any singularity. This initial predicament is the 
one in which the subject finds itself and in so doing becomes itself. 
There is the continual becoming of the subject even though, as has to be 
noted, this becoming’s actualization cannot be guaranteed in advance. 
Occurring here is the discontinuous continuity of the subject’s coming-
into-relation which is a setting informed by movement and is a forming 
movement that constitutes subjectivity. Rather than rush ahead it is 
essential to stay with the predicament, holding thereby to its presence 
as a question. 
 
Any engagement with that question already comprises a further 
entry into Dennis Schmidt’s work. He asks for a ‘better definition of 
what is at stake in the question of ethical life’.7 He affirms that ethics 
‘is first and foremost…. a way of life’. (There is the ensuing demand 
therefore that life be thought.) Equally, he will identify a ‘reawakening’ 
of a specific sense of historical consciousness as ‘the first step to 
recovering the possibility of an original ethics’.8  Addressing these 
‘stakes’ or that to which an ‘awakening’ might occur - and this may be 
an awakening to a way of life or to the recognition of already being 
 5 
there such that the recognition of the position is an awakening to a 
potentiality whose actualization had not occurred – all these possibilities 
have to be thought in terms of the recognition of a predicament, 
precisely because that is what formulations of this nature stage. While 
not presented in these terms the language of awakenings entails the 
recognition of potentialities that are yet to be fulfilled. Awakening 
occurs to a predicament.  
  
If the question of the predicament is taken as orientating the 
possibility of thinking life then it has to presuppose that life is thought, 
and thus is there to be thought. Life is not there as the merely given. 
The move from the given to thought - and thought’s own demands - is 
that which creates the problem. While Schmidt’s approach necessitates 
a thinking of the predicament, that demand remains without any 
sustained response. This absence results from the way life is present 
within his writing as a philosophical topos. Note the following 
formulation in which Schmidt in identifying one of the strengths of 
Gadmer’s analysis of the Kant’s Third Critique argues the following: 
 
Kant’s analysis of aesthetic experience demonstrates that this 
awakening to life is so firmly lodged in feeling that it cannot be 
cognised by any theoretical reason that can be scientized, nor can 
it be translated into conceptual language.9 
 
Life therefore – the movement of life – remains within a setting defined 
by the impossibility of a certain form of ‘translation’. An ‘awakening’ 
cannot be ‘translated’. Within the framework of Schmidt’s argument 
‘life’ is given within that setting. This is a distinct motif in Schmidt’s 
work. Life, Schmidt’s ‘life’, continually finds itself in a radical 
separation from the theoretical or the conceptual. Two points however 
need to be made in this regard. Indeed, they are two points that will 
continue and thus they will have an effect on what follows. In the first 
instance the argument has to be that this claim amounts to what might 
be described as the absolutization of life that identifies life not just with 
the continuity of its self-realization, but that this realization is of 
necessity unfettered. There is just an awakening. Or at least not 
fettered in a way that demands philosophical engagement. Or were 
there to be a restriction it will be lifted, its hold obviated, by an 
encounter with the work of art in particular or the aesthetic more 
generally. In sum what this means is that if it can be argued that life’s 
predicament pertains to the complex of relations given by the interplay 
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of potentiality, actualization and restriction then for Schmidt there will 
not be any form of restriction on the actualization of a potentiality. 
What is excised is twofold. In the first place it is the constitutive spacing 
that holds the predicament in place. It is a spacing in which the 
conditions that obtain have a necessity even though outcomes – 
actualizations etc. – have an essential contingency. (The good life, as a 
necessity, only ever has contingent outcomes.)  Then secondly the 
excision of the predicament as the setting of life entails the 
corresponding absence of any criteria for judgements to be made in 
relation to life. (This is the risk within the aesthetic.) 
 
The other response to the formulation that breaks the link 
between life and the conceptual has to begin with the argument that the 
identification of the impossibility of ‘translation’ into the ‘conceptual’ is 
itself already a conceptual claim about both the aesthetic and the work 
of art. Here it is vital to be precise. The argument is that this 
identification of the impossibility of such a ‘translation’ is not one that 
takes place on the level of the aesthetic. It is not therefore a position 
that can be identical with its being felt. Hence it has to be conceptual. 
And this is the case even if the sense of the conceptual remains at this 
stage an open question. The consequence is clear; there cannot be a 
separation of the aesthetic and the conceptual. They occur together and 
this is true even if their separation can be thought. It is a separation 
therefore that is conceptual. There is a spacing that holds them together 
and apart. There is therefore a prevailing sense of at-the-same-timeness 
that links feeling to the conceptual. It is a claim that in supervening on 
the aesthetic does so from the position of the conceptual. (Note here 
that this refusal of a link is in fact a conception of a relation that is 
lodged beyond a simple either/or.) After all, what type of claim is it 
that insists on non-translatability if it is itself not a feeling but in in fact 
a theoretical claim. It cannot be one without the other; at-the-same-
timeness prevails. Moreover, while it may be felt in terms of a form of 
separation, understanding that insistent separability is precisely that, an 
understanding. While Schmidt is drawing on positions in which Kant 
argues that ‘the judgment of taste determines the object, 
independently of concepts’ what has to be included is that this sense of 
independence still assumes a relation to the conceptual that is defined 
in terms of indetermination rather than determination10. However within 
the argumentation developed by Schmidt this evocation of the 
‘independent’ occurs as though it involved no relation at all. Moreover, 
it is this independence that allows for the distinction between what he 
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identifies as the ‘lyrical’ as opposed to the purely ‘ethical’ subject. The 
latter is a sense of subjectivity and thus the ethical that is defined by a 
relation to the law. In Schmidt’s formulation the ‘lyrical subject is that 
form of the subject disclosed in relation to the realm of aesthetic 
experience.’11 Remembering of course that what is taken to be the 
aesthetic is that which is thought in terms of a radical separation from 
any form of conceptual presence. (It is this separation that is in the end 
untenable.) 
 
The nature of these subjects – the lyrical and ethical to the 
extent that there really are two – must be the point of focus. If it can be 
argued that there cannot be such a distinction within the subject then 
subjectivity, as an integral part of its predicament then involves the 
impossibility of ever effecting this distinction. The subject is both lyrical 
and ethical. As such whatever determinations these positions had as 
separate entities vanishes in the need to think what is at stake in their 
presence both as a site of negotiation and as an already present 
relation. Indeed, rather than there being a resultant critique of the law 
in the name of the aesthetic, which would be he almost inevitable 
outcome of the refusal of a relation between the ethical and the 
conceptual, there would be a critique of the law in the name of law. The 
latter is of course a possibility that could not occur were there to be the 
separation or independence that Schmidt envisages. Schmidt has to 
equate law with statute and the ethical with the prescriptive. Hence 
what cannot be thought is another possibility for either the law or for 
ethics that transformed the nature of law or the nature of the ethical. 
Critique becomes unthinkable. Responding to this delimitation by 
refusing the identification of law and statute opens up as a potentiality 
linking the conditioned nature of any law, conditioned because always 
contestable, to the unconditioned demand of justice. Establishing that 
connection links justice to the actualization of a potentiality within law. 
The latter is the potentiality for any law to be just. Occurring at the 
same time, of course, is the emergence of criteria of judgement. 
 
2. 
 
There is within Schmidt’s extensive writings on the ethical a 
formulation of the ethical subject that is not defined in terms of the 
distinction between the lyrical and the ethical. Again, what is central is 
the interplay between life and the way that Kant’s philosophical project 
allows for openings in which life, always as a philosophical topos, can be 
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thought. To begin with the former means beginning with the insistence 
of life that can be identified within Schmidt’s writings. One fundamental 
instance can be found in the reference to Schiller’s formulation 
concerning ‘the deepest centre of life’ which is for Schmidt ‘the 
freedom that I am’. While explicating this formulation will in the in end 
involve a return to Kant at this stage this ‘I’ opens up a thinking of the 
ethical subject. This is the ‘I’ whose possibility inheres in the actuality 
of ‘ethical life’. Of the latter Schmidt writes that it has to be 
understood in terms ‘of the preservation of the dignity of the human 
that resides in freedom’.12 This is the claim within which the possibilities 
of the already noted ‘awakenings’ endure. Moreover, it is a claim that in 
bringing dignity and freedom together allows the question of the good to 
be posed. A question with its own attendant complications because of 
the way it is taken up by Schmidt. He writes that ‘the question of the 
good remains as the question of the good of life itself’.13 It is the 
intentional ambivalence of this formulation that is both striking and 
signifcant. Note that he does not write the question ‘of the good life’. 
Were he to have done so then his formulation would have recalled 
fundamental positions within both Greek and Roman ethics. And as a 
result the question of the possibility of attaining that life would then 
have emerged. In emerging ‘the good life’ though now as a potentiality 
rather than as an assumed state of affairs would have acquired a certain 
force. Rather, he writes specifically ‘of the good of life’. Now while that 
formulation may be understood in terms of the ‘good life’ what it allows 
in addition is the more direct interpretation, namely the inscription of 
the good within the project of life itself; the project and thus the point 
of life.  
 
What, after all, is ‘the good of life’? For Schmidt, it is important 
to add, his formulation is, to use his own description, withdrawn from 
‘any conception of right or wrong’.14 Again, given this withdrawal how 
would ‘the good of life’ be understood? What is ‘the good of life’? Two 
positions that have already been noted make an answer to this question 
possible. The first is the evocation of ‘dignity’. There is in his 
argumentation an intrinsic link between ethical life and dignity. The 
second involves having to insist on the projective character of the 
formulation ‘the good of life’. It is projective in a precise sense. There is 
no attribution of a telos to life. As though there were an end point. 
Rather, the argument would have to be that life is imbued at every 
moment with a project. That project however is an immanent presence.  
And precisely because of the nature of that presence it allows for the 
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claim that ‘the good of life’ is the possibility of dignity’s actuality and is 
thus the process of its actualization; a process that cannot have a 
necessary outcome. Good comes to be defined in terms of the continuity 
of actualization. And yet, lives lived without dignity are possible, 
moreover such a possibility is there as a constant threat. To rework this 
formulation it can be suggested that if dignity’s projective possibility is 
‘the good of life’ then the concern then has to be the actualization of 
that good. Hence it is not just ‘the perseveration of dignity’, to return 
to Schmidt’s formulation, more significantly it is dignity’s actualization. 
To go further, it can be argued, that the preservation envisages 
actualization and that actualization envisages preservation. Their 
interplay opens up the predicament within which ‘we’ are. While it does 
not emerge as an object of thought for Schmidt, a position in part 
explained by a failure to engage with what is entailed by having to 
preserve dignity, the writings evince a clear understanding that what is 
involved is a setting of this kind precisely because he does connect what 
he calls ‘original ethics’ to a ‘moment’ in which what is disclosed is a 
‘relation to time and history’. In the same context he evokes Heidegger 
on the necessity ‘for a critique of the present historical moment’.15 This 
is the context in which the language of a ‘reawakening’ also appears. 
The predicament begins to take on a more demanding quality since what 
are needed are criteria of judgement and thus the possibility of critique. 
This necessitates recourse to the conceptual on the one hand and the 
recognition, on the other, that life continually divides between 
potentiality and actuality. This would be the setting in which any 
awakening occurs. There cannot be a solitary awakening.  
 
 In order to continue it is essential to underscore that what is at 
stake here continues to centre on would what can be described, via a 
type of shorthand, not as an awakening but as a situated awakening. If 
there is the necessity for an awakening, then there has to be an account 
of sleep, of what prompts awakening, and that to which this awakening 
moves. Sleep becomes the naturalisation of normativity. Within this 
‘sleep’ there are intimations of other possibilities. There are hints as 
much within dreams as there are in types of everydayness, and thus also 
in factical life and giveness. These hints, glimmerings of other 
possibilities, ecstatic instances, are simply moments whose fragility 
continues to allow them to be subdued. For if there were to be more 
than the hint, more than an intimation of another possibility, then they 
have to be defined in relation to what might be described as form 
creating. Not only does this entail that an image that is already 
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determined, that is already formed, is not that which is brought to the 
intimated. That would stall the possible by identifying with a pre-
existing image. It is rather that there has to be an allowing and thus a 
holding open in which there are occurrences. Action and form creating 
when taken together allow the law to be distanced because of the law’s 
failure to secure dignity let lone allow for its ‘preservation’. All such 
claims are judgements and inhering within them are suggestions of that 
which is right and that which is wrong. Though these terms once rid of a 
simply moral character come to be terms that are bound up with the 
human being as an ontological presence; a presence that is both felt and 
thought; only always already placed with others. All these elements 
present are at the same time. 
 
3. 
 
If there is a way through this problem then it resides in a specific 
thinking of the Kantian project. Schmidt will continue to distance the 
role of the conceptual within the Kantian project in ways that are 
consistent with his overall thinking. In regards to the latter a direct 
instance can be found in his text ‘The Monstrous, Catastrophe, and 
Ethical Life: Hegel, Heidegger and Antigone’. Here Schmidt writes the 
following in relation to the Antigone: 
the great achievement of Antigone is found in the way it 
condenses the riddles of ethical life while simultaneously showing 
that these conflicts emerge from a region that given ethical terms 
cannot grasp and that cannot be grasped by the conceptual 
language of philosophy. That is why both place great emphasis on 
the poetic character of this text.16 (My emphasis) 
What can be left aside here is the accuracy of this as an interpretation 
of Antigone. What is of greater interest is twofold. First of all, note that 
he writes of ‘given ethical terms’ and then goes on to claim that certain 
ethical terms fall outside the hold of ‘the conceptual language of 
philosophy’ (My emphasis). More significantly, in this particular text 
Schmidt is keen to argue that Hegel and Heidegger’s contribution to a 
thinking of ’ethical life’ is premised on this positioning of a limitation of 
the conceptual. And yet that positioning depends upon the suspension of 
the ‘given’. This gift – and it is the locus created by the gift, a gift that 
could equally be understood as a staging of the predicament in which we 
are - that would have to be suspended in order to allow for the very 
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project that Schmidt wants. This is not a claim made by a ‘lyrical 
subject’. This is a decision.  As such, it is a conceptual claim. And yet, 
the conceptual is refused because the suspension of the given remains 
unthought. Nothing is being adduced here. Schmidt’s formulations 
continue to set the measure. Again in another text, ‘Schmidt argues 
that,  
 
nature, as Kant comes to understand it in the Third Critique 
cannot be spoken of, or thought, according to the laws of 
conceptual language.17   
 
This position has much greater extension than an interpretation of Kant. 
In a different context here makes the much more substantive claim that,  
 
At the point where our rules and our conceptualizing powers 
break off, the ethical moment begins’.18  
 
The stakes have become much greater. The ethical moment begins when 
there is a break down. But what does it mean for these powers to ‘break 
off’. There is a further question, i.e. how is this moment to be 
understood in relation to dreams, awakening, etc.? Is this breakdown the 
same as the awakening? There is a clear path here that leads to an 
argument made in relation to Kant.  
 
Note the formulation in the First Introduction to the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment Kant advances the following decisive 
formulation: 
 
The purposiveness of nature is thus a special a priori concept that 
has its origin strictly in the reflecting power of judgment. For we 
cannot ascribe to the products of nature anything like a relation 
of nature in them to ends, but can only use this concept in order 
to reflect on the connection of appearances in nature that are 
given in accordance with empirical laws. This concept is also 
entirely distinct from that of practical purposiveness (of human 
art as well as of morals), although it is certainly conceived of in 
terms of an analogy with that.19 
 
What the above makes clear is that the conceptual powers do not ‘break 
off’. They have to be rethought in terms of the ‘purposiveness of 
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nature’. It is this passage that needs to be read in relation to §42 in 
which the ‘beautiful soul’ appears. The latter is the following:  
 
This preeminence of the beauty of nature over the beauty of art 
in alone awakening an immediate interest, even if the former 
were to be surpassed by the latter in respect of form, is in 
agreement with the refined and well-founded thinking of all 
human beings who have cultivated their moral feeling. If a man 
who has enough taste to judge about products of beautiful art 
with the greatest correctness and refinement gladly leaves the 
room in which are to be found those beauties that sustain vanity 
and at best social joys and turns to the beautiful in nature, in 
order as it were to find here an ecstasy for his spirit in a line of 
thought that he can never fully develop, then we would consider 
this choice of his with esteem and presuppose in him a beautiful 
soul.20 
 
What sense of finitude emerges in this passage? There is a limitation. 
How is it to be understood? It inheres not just in the move from objects 
to nature – from art works to nature – there is something else at stake. 
Kant is clear concerning the beautiful. It is not a predicate of an object 
rather it pertains to what he describes as the ‘form’ of the object. That 
is, it pertains to the object’s generalizable conditions of intuitability. 
This is the position that underpins subjective universality. The turn to 
nature therefore is the turn to the possibility of form itself. The 
limitation is not linked to conceptual let alone to its suspension. One the 
contrary it pertains to a relation between the conditioned and the 
unconditioned. There is a relation; a setting in which the separation 
between them creates a space. Indeed, it inscribes a space that 
becomes a space of activity. However, the spacing that emerges here 
does so precisely because of the presence of that which is conceptual. 
Not conceptual in the way that concepts determine particulars but 
conceptual in the precise sense that the concept is an immanent 
condition. It occurs both in and as what might be described as the 
spacing of indetermination that demands not just the presence of the 
conceptual in terms of the presence of the unconditioned, but the 
recognition that the distinction between the conditioned and the 
unconditioned is itself as much a felt and lived condition as it is a 
conceptual one. It is both, at the same time.  Again there is a 
constitutive spacing and a pervasive sense of at-the-same-timeness. 
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 The limit that emerges is clear from Schmidt’s account of Kant. 
Within the argumentation that occurs in Kant’s texts there is neither a 
breaking off nor a suspension of the conceptual. What there is a relation 
of indetermintion between the unconditioned and the conditioned. 
Moreover, it is precisely the presence of relations of indetermination 
that establishes a link between the Second and Third Critiques.21 
Schmidt does not follow Kant for whom there is always a relation 
between the aesthetic and the conceptual. What he does is assume that 
the recognition of an ‘impasse’ allows for the abandoning of the 
conceptual in the name of the aesthetic. (Again, this is position that is 
reached when the alternative could have been a reworking of the 
conceptual.) Not only is this a conceptual rather than an aesthetic 
response, it is also true that it has at last two important consequences. 
Firstly that the positioning he adopts remains unthought in the precise 
sense that what it always essential is the positing of that which while 
orientating the ethical is itself ‘unintelligible’ or unthinkable’.22 The 
second consequence is connected. What is lost in the process is what 
Schmidt’s project knows it needs i.e. not just the capacity for judgment 
but their criteria. Those criteria can only emerge from the recognition of 
what has already been identified as a predicament. Hölderlin as Schmidt 
knows is prescient here. The famous line from Die Titanen - Denn keiner 
trägt das Leben allein – while opening a way towards a thinking of death 
does so in the precise sense of locating finitude within the 
ineliminability of relationality. ‘We’ die alone with others. It is the alone 
that is the mark of the other. That is the setting that has to be thought. 
That is ‘our’ predicament. 
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